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We present an overview of recently developed data-driven
tools for safety analysis of autonomous vehicles and advanced
driver assist systems. The core algorithms combine model-based,
hybrid system reachability analysis with sensitivity analysis of
components with unknown or inaccessible models. We illustrate
the applicability of this approach with a new case study of
emergency braking systems in scenarios with two or three
vehicles. This problem is representative of the most common
type of rear-end crashes, which is relevant for safety analysis
of automatic emergency braking (AEB) and forward collision
avoidance systems. We show that our verification tool can effec-
tively prove the safety of certain scenarios (specified by several
parameters like braking profiles, initial velocities, uncertainties
in position and reaction times), and also compute the severity of
accidents for unsafe scenarios. Through hundreds of verification
experiments, we quantified the safety envelope of the system
across relevant parameters. These results show that the approach
is promising for design, debugging and certification. We also show
how the reachability analysis can be combined with statistical
information about the parameters, to assess the risk-level of
the control system, which in turn is essential, for example, for
determining Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) for the
ISO26262 standard.
Index Terms—Safety verification, Autonomous driving system,
ASILs, Risk analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
There is now a race to create commercial autonomous vehi-
cles and more advanced driving assist systems (ADAS). These
safety-critical, cyber-physical systems (CPS) use hierarchical
control, long supply chains, and increasingly, machine learning
algorithms. Existing design and test methodologies are inad-
equate for providing the needed level of safety assurances.
Koopman [1] argues how naı¨ve test-driving for reasonable
catastrophic failure rates for a fleet of vehicles can grow to
hundreds of billions of miles. At the time of writing, driverless
tests from Waymo and Tesla range around 100 million miles
and are punctuated by disengagements1. Precisely measuring
risks of these new technologies remains problematic, and the
regulations needed for mitigating the risks are indefinite [2].
Could formal verification algorithms provide answers to
these challenges? Software model checking, for example,
can find design bugs and provide rigorous safety guarantees
and have proven to be practical in several domains. The
computational problems related to automatically checking the
safety of CPS are notoriously difficult (undecidable). Even
1A disengagement is an event where the human driver has to take over
control from automation to prevent a hazard.
approximate solutions exist only for relatively simple linear
models. Another fundamental problem is that traditional veri-
fication methods rely on closed-form, mathematical models of
the system (e.g., differential equations and automata). In con-
trast, automotive systems with hundreds of modules, model-
based controllers, machine learning-based units, and fine-
tuned lookup tables look less like a model. Could verification
algorithms work for systems with possibly incomplete models?
In this article, we report on recent research on data-driven
verification that answers this question in the affirmative and
we illustrate the promise of this approach with a detailed case
study. The key idea is to combine traditional verification of
known parts of the model, with sensitivity-analysis of the un-
known parts that are only executable. Sensitivity analysis gives
bounds on how much the states or outputs of a module change,
with small changes in the input parameters. In a sequence of
papers, we have presented sensitivity analysis algorithms for
systems that use available knowledge of models and execution
data. Based on these algorithms, we have developed data-
driven verification tools C2E2 [3] and DRYVR [4]. These
tools can certify the safety of an automotive control system
under a set of scenarios, or automatically find unsafe scenarios
(counter-examples) that violate the safety requirements. In
Section II, we present an overview of the inner workings of
these techniques. Previous case studies have established the
effectiveness of these algorithms in verification of a benchmark
engine control system, a NASA-developed collision alerting
protocol, and satellite controllers. More recently, DryVR has
been used to analyze a range of autonomous and ADAS-based
maneuvers [4].
We present a new detailed case study on emergency braking
systems in Section II-A. More than 25% of all reported
accidents are rear-end crashes [5], of which around 85%
happen on straight roads. Emergency braking and forward col-
lision warning systems are becoming standard ADAS features.
However, testing safety of such systems can be nontrivial [6].
The safe braking profiles for a sequence of cars on the highway
depend on several factors—initial separation, velocities, vehi-
cle dynamics, reaction times, road surface etc. Our data-driven
verification tool works with black-box or unknown vehicle
models, using which we can prove, for example, that a given
braking profile is safe for a set of scenarios characterized by
the ranges of initial separation (d) and reaction times (r). For
unsafe scenarios, the tool can compute the worst case relative
velocity of the collision, which determines the severity of the
accident. This type of analysis can be used as a design tool for
tuning the braking profiles for different highway speeds, road
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
06
40
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  2
1 A
pr
 20
17
2conditions, etc. We analyzed hundreds of scenarios to generate
a safety surface that can aid such design and analysis. Finally,
we show how data-driven verification can be used for risk
analysis. ISO26262 [7] classifies different control subsystems
to risk levels (Automotive Safety Integrity Levels or ASILs)
and prescribes process-based requirements to reduce those
risks to acceptable levels. The risk here is broadly defined
as severity of accident × probability of occurrence . As-
sessing these quantities for complex control systems, however,
remains more of an art. In [6] the authors propose a method
based on extensive simulations. In contrast, verification gives
a provable bound on the severity of accidents for each range
of d and r values. We show that this can be combined with
statistical information about the distributions of d and r to
obtain the risk associated with the system for a given speed
and braking profile.
In summary, we present an argument for data-driven formal
verification as a foundation for building design automation
tools for safe autonomous vehicles and ADAS systems. Specif-
ically, our algorithms combining hybrid system verification
and automated sensitivity analysis of black-box models, show
promise for both online monitoring and practical design-time
and analysis.
II. VERIFICATION FROM MODELS AND DATA
Correctness of verification ultimately relies on the underly-
ing system model which may or may not be completely known.
We begin by considering dynamical systems—a simple yet
very powerful modeling formalism. W have generalized it to
more expressive formalisms like switched and hybrid systems,
and we refer the interested readers to the article [3].
A dynamical system is represented by an ordinary differen-
tial equation (ODE):
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)) (1)
which describes the time-derivative, and hence, the time evolu-
tion of a vector x of real-valued state variables (e.g., velocity,
torque, steering angles, fuel-flow rates, etc.) with an input
signal u(t). Let us fix an input, and denote by ξ(x0, t) the
solution of (1) from a particular initial state x0 at time t ≥ 0.
The exact state is usually hard to estimate; let K be the set of
possible initial states, T > 0 be the time horizon of interest,
and U be a subset of unsafe states. U are the states where
speed limits are violated, emissions are excessive, collisions
occur, or other bad things happen. The verification question
can be written as:
{x | ∃x0 ∈ K, t ∈ [0, T ], ξ(x0, t) = x} ∩ U = ∅ ? (2)
That is, is there a behaviors of the system from K that enter a
bad state within T time. The set on the left hand side is called
the reachset.
If f is a nonlinear function or is unknown, then com-
puting reachsets can be notoriously difficult. In fact, even
if f is known, ξ(x0, t) may not be computable as a closed
form function of x0 and t. However, it is usually possible
to execute or numerically simulate (1), and generate data
for ξ(x0, 0), ξ(x0, τ), ξ(x0, 2τ), . . . , ξ(x0, T ) [8]. Data-driven
verification algorithms approximate reachsets using this sim-
ulation data and sensitivity of ξ(x0, t) to the changes in x0.
A. Safety Analysis of Automatic Emergency Braking Systems
An automotive control system model typically consists
of several modes—for example, cruising, braking, shifting,
merging, etc., and the software controller switches between
these modes based on sensors and drivers’ inputs. This gives
rise to a hybrid system that combines ODEs with an automaton
that defines the allowed mode switches.
Consider for example an Automatic Emergency Braking
(AEB) system (Figure 1): Car1,Car2 and Car3 are cruising
down the highway with zero relative velocity and certain initial
relative separation; Car1 suddenly switches to a braking mode
and starts slowing down according to a certain deceleration
profile. Irrespective of whether Car2 is human-driven, AEB-
equipped, or fully autonomous, certain amount of time elapses,
before Car2 switches to a braking mode. We call this the
reaction time r. Similarly, the mode switch for Car3 happens
after a delay. Obviously, Car2’s safety is in jeopardy: if it
brakes “too hard” it will be rear-ended and if it is “too gentle”
then it would have a forward collision. The envelope of safe
(no collision) behaviors depend on all the parameters: initial
separations, velocities, braking profiles, and reaction times.
It is easy to see that if we can solve the safety verification
problem described above, then we can also compute this
envelope and determine whether a given AEB system is safe
over a range of scenarios.
Delving deeper into this system, we remark that the exact
vehicle dynamics and braking profiles are typically complex
or unknown, but we can simulate the system. For the results
in Sections IV,V, for example, we used a black-box vehicle
model from Mathworks R© demo [9]. Each car can be viewed
a hybrid system: it has several continuous state variables:
deceleration rate a(t), velocity v(t) and position s(t) and
two modes: cruise and brake. In the cruise mode, the
car maintains a constant speed, and in the brake mode, it
decelerates according to a certain braking profile for a(t),
which is an input to the system. The initial set K of the
system is defined by the uncertainties in the initial vehicle ve-
locities (v1(0), v2(0), v3(0)) and the initial separations d12, d23
between the vehicles. The unsafe set U corresponds to states
where there is a collision, that is, the separation between a pair
of cars is less than some threshold. In case of collisions, we
would be interested in the maximum possible relative velocity
just before the collision, which strongly influences the severity
of the accident.
The key parameters we will consider in this paper are the
reaction time or the delay r in switching to the braking mode,
the initial separation d between the cars.
III. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND VERIFICATION
ALGORITHMS
Data-driven verification algorithms rely on computing
reachsets from models and simulation data. First we discuss a
situation where a lot of information about the system model is
available, and this is exploited by the verification algorithm.
3Fig. 1: Cars cruising and braking in a single lane configuration.
Then step by step we will drop these assumptions and arrive
at algorithms that only use the system as a black-box.
A. Verification Algorithm
As mentioned in the introduction, the key idea is to use sim-
ulations to determine the sensitivity of the system’s solution
ξ(x0, t) to changes in initial conditions x0. Formally, sensitiv-
ity is quantified by the the following notion discrepancy.
Definition 1. A uniformly continuous nonnegative function β
is a discrepancy function of (1) if (a) for any pair of states
x, x′, and any time t > 0,
‖ξ(x, t)− ξ(x′, t)‖ ≤ β(x, x′, t), and (3)
(b) for any t, as x→ x′, β(·, ·, t)→ 0.
Recall, the safety verification problem of Equation (2).
Assuming that a discrepancy function β is available for the
system (1), the safety verification algorithm for (1) proceeds
as follows:
1) Compute a δ-cover C = {xi}ki=1 of the initial set K, i.e.,
K ⊆ ∪iBδ(xi).
2) For each xi ∈ C, a simulation ψ(xi) from xi is computed.
3) The simulation ψ(xi) from xi is expanded by a factor
given by the discrepancy, such that this expanded sim-
ulation R(ψ(x0), β, δ) over-approximates all the states
reachable from a δ-neighborhood of xi over the time
horizon T .
4) If this reach set R(ψ(x0), β) is disjoint from the unsafe
set U then xi is removed from the cover C. Else if any
interval of the simulation ψ(x0) is contained in U then
output Unsafe and ψ(x0) serves as a counter-example
or bug trace. Otherwise, if neither case holds, then xi is
replaced in C by a finer cover of the δ-neighborhood of
xi.
5) If the cover C becomes empty, then output Safe.
This simple algorithm computes increasingly finer covers
of K until the reachsets R(ψ(x0), β, δ) from each of the
elements in the cover are inferred to be disjoint from the unsafe
set U or a counter-example simulation is discovered. The
second property of the discrepancy function ensures that as the
elements in the cover become finer, the over-approximation of
the computed reachsets becomes more precise. A simple 2-D
illustration of the verification algorithm in action is shown in
Figure 2.
Essentially the same idea can be made to work for switched
and hybrid models like the emergency braking scenarios
described in Section III-B (see [3] for details). The main
complication is that because of the over-approximations in the
Fig. 2: Conceptual demonstration of data-driven verification. Red
rectangle: Unsafe states, Cyan rectangle: Uncertainty space. Simula-
tions (blue lines) cannot guarantee safety, but simulation data together
with sensitivity analysis can give coverage (grey region) to prove
safety (green region) or help identify bugs quickly.
computed reachsets, we have to keep track of spurious mode
changes.
The algorithm has been proved to be sound and relatively
complete in [3]. Soundness means that whenever the Algo-
rithm returns Safe or Unsafe, then the system is indeed safe
or unsafe, respectively. For example, if the algorithm returns
safe for a AEB scenario with certain braking profiles, then
there is guaranteed to be no collisions until all the cars stop.
If the algorithm returns Unsafe, then there are particular
parameter values, such as the initial separations and reaction
times, that leads to a collision. In this case, our tool will
compute an upper-bound on the maximum relative velocity
of all collisions that can arise from the considered range of
parameter values. Relative completeness means the algorithm
will always terminate whenever the system is either robustly
safe or robustly unsafe.
B. Computing Discrepancy
The key ingredient for the above verification algorithm is
a good discrepancy funciton β. One can get an exponentially
growing discrepancy function β(x, x′, t) = ||x−x′||eLt, where
L is a Lipshitz constant for f , but even for moderately large L,
the reachset over-approximations R(ψ(x0), β, δ) blow-up, and
the verification algorithm would get clogged by large number
of refinements.
Methods for computing tight discrepancy functions for
linear ODEs were presented in [3], [10], but the problem
remained open for general nonlinear models. In [11], an
approach was presented for nonlinear systems that aimed to
compute local discrepancy functions that are relevant only over
small parts of the state space. It was shown that this preserves
the soundness and relative completeness of the verification
algorithm, and this approach lies at the core of our first data-
driven verification tool for C2E2 [3].
Previous methods for computing discrepancy in [10], [11]
rely on availability of a closed-form system model (i.e. the
dynamical function f ). In many practical control systems, the
model is at least partly unavailable or it is too complicated
for deriving a closed-form description. In this case, hybrid
4control systems can be described by combining a black-box
simulator for trajectories and a white-box transition graph
specifying mode switches. When we only have access to a
black-box simulator, a probabilistic algorithm can be used
to learn the parameters of exponential discrepancy functions
from simulation data. This is the basis for our new data-driven
verification tool DryVR [4].
The DryVR algorithm transforms the problem of learning
the parameters of the discrepancy function to the problem of
learning a linear separator for a set of points in 2-dimensions
that are obtained from transforming the simulation data. The
idea of the algorithm works as follows: (1) Draw m sam-
ples of initial states xi, i = 1, . . . ,m from initial set K,
(2) Simulate the black-box simulator to get sampled traces
ξ(xi, tk), i = 1, . . . ,m, k = 0, . . . , N , where tN = T is the
time bound, (3) Minimize
∫ T
t=0
ceγt such that ceγt with c, γ
a scalar value is a valid discrepancy function for any pair
of traces ξ(xi, t), ξ(xj , t), i, j = 1, . . . ,m and for any time
t = tk, k = 0, . . . , N . With the PAC-learnability of concepts
with low VC-dimension, it can be shown that for δ,  > 0, if
m ≥ 1 ln 1δ , then with probability ≤ δ, the constructed dis-
crepancy function ceγt does not work for more than  fraction
of the points in the initial set K. Assuming that the discrepancy
function is correct, the DryVR verification algorithm gives
the same soundness and relative completeness quarantees as
stated in Section III-A. Our experiments suggest that a few
dozen simulation traces are adequate for learning discrepancy
functions with nearly 100% correctness, for typical automotive
models.
C. Determining Severity of Collisions using Reachability
Let us consider the AEB systems discussed in Section II-A
and see how reachability analysis can guarantee safety of
scenarios and compute worst-case collision velocities.
(a) Safe case: reachtubes of po-
sition are separated by a dis-
tance ≥ 2 for any time.
(b) Unafe case: at least a pair of
reachtubes of position for some
time are contained in the unsafe
region (≤ 2 separations).
Fig. 3: Safety of the AEB system. Horizontal axis is time in
seconds, vertical axis is position in meters.
Fix the initial velocities and braking profiles for all the
cars, fix the ranges for initial separations and reaction times, if
DRYVR returns safe (and the learned discrepancy is correct),
then it means the distance between any two cars is always
larger than the threshold value θ = 2 meters at all times,
before the cars stop. Figure 3a shows the projection of the
reachsets plotted against time for the entire range of initial
conditions; the range of positions for Car1 (red),Car2 (green)
and Car3(blue ) are separated by at least 2 meters. If DRYVR
returns unsafe, then it also computes parameter values (initial
separations d12, d23, reaction times r2, r3) that lead to a state
where the cars have less than 2 meters separation. In Figure 3b,
the reachsets for position overlap indicating a collision and
in this case the tool also over-approximates the worst case
relative velocity in the collision. For example, in the particular
example the worst case collision velocity between Car1 and
Car2 is 9.0(m/s).
IV. RISK ANALYSIS FOR ASIL
Reachability analysis can be used for determining risk
levels of an automotive control system. According to
ISO 26262 ASIL classification, risk is broadly defined as
severity of accident × probability of occurence. For the
AEB system with 2 cars, the severity is largely determined
by the relative velocity of collision, which is approximated
from the above reachability analysis.
The probability of occurrence depends on the probability
distributions on the parameters (d, r, etc.). In general, these
distributions can be complicated. As a starting point, the
preliminary study presented in [6], use empirical observations
to construct distributions on initial separation (d) which turns
out to be a skewed Gaussian with the mean dependent on
the car speed. Similarly, the reaction time distribution is also
a skewed Gaussian. Examples of such distributions are built
using [6], [12] and shown in Figures 4a and 4b, where the
separation d ranges over [40, 50] meters and reaction time r
ranges over [0.7, 2.4] seconds.
We analyze the risk by dividing [40, 50] in to 10 consecutive
small intervals [dil, d
i
u], i = 1, . . . , 10, and [0.7, 2.4] into 17
consecutive intervals [ril , r
i
u], j = 1, . . . , 17. For each region
consists of small intervals of d and r, we use DRYVR to
verify safety or compute the worst case collision velocity. To
compute the probability of the accident occurring, we need
to compute the probability that each parameter lies in the
given range. For distributions shown in Figures 4a and 4b,
the probability of the region d ∈ [dil, diu], r ∈ [rjl , rju] is
Pr(d ∈ [dil, diu]) × Pr(r ∈ [rjl , rju]) if we assume the events
d ∈ [dil, diu]) and r ∈ [rjl , rju] are independent. For example,
Pr(41 ≤ d ≤ 42, 1.0 ≤ r ≤ 1.1) = 0.19× 0.139 = 0.026.
With the given braking profile and initial velocity of both
cars, we can compute the worst case relative velocity for region
of d and r. We report the results in Figure 4c. The numbers
correspond to each rectangle in the figure are the worst case
relative velocities. For example, for the case d ∈ [40, 41] and
r ∈ [2.3, 2.4], the worst case relative velocity vc is 17.5(m/s).
We also plot the heat map of risks as the background of Figure
4c, where the green rectangles with number 0 correspond to
the safe cases. Combined with the probability of occurrence,
we can compute the expected velocity in the collision for
Figure 4 to be E[vc] =
∑10
i=1
∑17
j=1 Pr(d ∈ [dil, diu])×Pr(r ∈
[rjl , r
j
u]) × vc(i, j) = 2.86(m/s). Therefore, for AEB system
with given braking profile and initial veclocity for each car,
and given distributions for initial separations and reaction
times, we can compute the risk defined in ASIL as the
expected worst case relative velocity for the collisions.
5(a) Initial separation distribution (b) Reaction time distribution
(c) Worst case relative velocities (m/s) for the collisions. Braking
profiles are fixed (Car1: mild brake, Car2: medium brake) and initial
velocities are 30(m/s).
Fig. 4: AEB of two cars: probability and severity
V. INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
Data-driven verification can be used to gain detailed in-
sights about the safety of autonomous and ADAS systems
under different scenarios and parameter variations. For the
emergency braking system with two and three vehicles, we
have analyzed hundreds of experiments; the summary of the
worst-case relative collision velocities computed from these
experiments are shown in Figures 5.
We consider 3 different braking profiles for each vehicle:
mild, medium and hard. The average deceleration rate in-
creases from mild to hard. The risk analysis can also be applied
to any braking profile like the threshold braking and cadence
braking used in Anti-lock Braking Systems. Figures 5a and 5d
show the collision heat maps with fixed initial velocities but
changing braking profiles for two cars. From Figures 5a, 5b
and 5d, we observe that if the lead and the following cars
have the similar level of braking, the safe regions are nearly
invariant. However, with the increasing of the braking level,
the severity (relative velocities) of collisions also increase.
Comparing with Figure 5d, we can see that if the lead car
brakes harder than the follower, then as expected, the safety
regions shrink rapidly. Moreover, the collisions are more
severe than those in the previous case with both cars braking
equally hard. If the lead car brakes more gently (Figure 4c),
then the severity reduces quickly. Therefore, qualitatively, it is
safer for the following car to choose a braking profile harder
or equal to the braking profile of the lead car.
Figures 5d-5f show a sequence of collision heat map with
fixed braking but changing initial velocities. As expected,
both the area of the unsafe regions and severity of collisions
decrease with reduction of the initial velocities. The analysis
enables us to prove that, for example, the system is safe when
the initial velocities of both cars are less than 17(m/s) for the
given braking profiles and reaction times.
For the system with three cars, we consider scenarios with 4
parameters: the initial separations d12, d23 and reaction times
r2, r3. For visualizing the risk, we fix the range of 2 parameters
while varying the others. Fixing the reaction times of both
Car2 and Car3 to be within the range [1.8, 1.9](s), we analyze
the change of safety envelope with respect to the change of
d12 and d23. Figure 5g shows that the system is collision-free
only when both the distances d12 and d23 are large enough.
Compare Figure 5g with Figure 5e when all the cars have
the same initial velocities and braking profiles. We can see
the when the reaction time is between [1.8, 1.9](s), the safe
distance change from d > 44(m) for system with two cars
to d12 > 47(m), d23 > 49(m) for system with three cars.
Therefore, with the increase of number of cars in a chain, the
“safe” distance between any pair of cars increases as well.
Next, fixing the distance d12, d23 to be within the range
[44, 45](m), we analyze the change of safety envelope with
respect to the change of reaction time r2, r3. Figure 5h
shows that the cars are collision free only if both Car2 and
Car3’s reaction time are short enough. Compared with Figure
5e again, when the distance between the cars are between
[44, 45](m), the safe reaction time change from r < 1.9(s)
for the two cars scenario to r2 < 1.7(s), r3 < 1.6(s) for three
cars scenario. Both Figure 5g and 5h show quantitatively that
the safety envelope shrinks with the increase of number of
cars in the system.
As the running time for each scenario is 3 − 5 seconds
on a standard laptop, it takes 5 − 30 minutes to generate a
heat map, which suggest that similar analysis could be applied
to more complicated scenarios with larger number of modes,
parameters, and more sophisticated ADAS systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
We sketched recent developments in verification tools of
CPS that combine formal reasoning with simulation data to
effectively prove safety or estimate worst case accidents for
automotive control systems. Our case study with emergency
braking show that designers can use the tool for analyzing
autonomous driving and ADAS features under a variety of
traffic scenarios. Engineering the tools to scale to bigger
scenarios with many more modes and vehicles while achieving
near real-time performance will be an natural and important
next step.
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6(a) Car1 and Car2: mild brake,initial velocity: 30(m/s) (b)
Car1 and Car2: hard brake,
initial velocity: 30(m/s) (c)
Car1: medium brake, Car2: mild brake,
initial velocity: 30(m/s)
(d) Car1 and Car2: medium brake,initial velocity: 30(m/s) (e)
Car1 and Car2: medium brake,
initial velocity: 22(m/s) (f)
Car1 and Car2: medium brake,
initial velocity: 18(m/s)
(g)
Initial separation: d23 vs d12.
Fix the reaction time of both Car2 and Car3:
r2, r3 ∈ [1.8, 1.9](s). (h)
Reaction time: r3 vs r2.
Fix the initial separation of both pairs of cars:
d12, d23 ∈ [44, 45](m)
Fig. 5: Top row: two cars with different braking profiles and fixed initial velocities. Middle row left to right: two cars with decreasing
velocities and fixed braking profiles. Bottom row: three cars with each car’s deceleration is medium hard, and initial velocity is 22(m/s).
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